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ABSTRACT
The struggle between the NCAA and student-athletes is one that will not slow down.
The issue is whether the mandatory student-athlete agreement is reasonable and,
further, if student-athletes should be compensated for the use of their likeness? The
answers to these questions are crucial with over a century of tradition on the line.
This comment analyzes the recent Ninth Circuit decision through an antitrust and
right of publicity lens. Additionally, this comment proposes a solution that allows
student-athletes to receive some type of compensation while the NCAA preserves
amateurism.
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STUDENT-ATHLETES PUT FULL-COURT PRESSURE ON THE NCAA FOR
THEIR RIGHTS
TAYLOR RISKIN*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PREGAME WARM-UP
The National Collegiate Athletic Association states it “is a membership-driven
organization dedicated to safeguarding the well-being of student-athletes and
equipping them with the skills to succeed on the playing field, in the classroom and
throughout life.”1 The opportunity to grow as a player, student, and person are just a
few of the bedrock principles that drive the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”) to help student-athletes succeed.
Originally under NCAA policy, student-athletes received no type of direct
payment; however, they were eligible to receive a scholarship that covered tuition.
In July 2009, a former UCLA basketball player, Ed O’Bannon (“O’Bannon”), filed
a lawsuit against the NCAA, Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”), and Electronic
Arts (“EA”).2 O’Bannon, accompanied by twenty other former basketball and football
college athletes, alleged the defendants violated the Sherman Antitrust Act and took
actions that deprived him of his right of publicity. 3 Ultimately, this challenged the
NCAA’s policy.
On August 8, 2014, Judge Wilken ruled that the NCAA’s practice of barring
payments to its athletes violated antitrust laws. 4 This ruling expanded the
scholarships to cover the cost of attendance, including living expenses in full. 5
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direction and encouragement while writing this comment. I would like to thank The John Marshall
Law School and The Review of Intellectual Property Law for providing me with ample opportunities.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for the continued support throughout my law
school career.
1 Who We Are, NCAA (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are.
2 Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW, 2011 WL 2185126 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011)
[hereinafter Second Amended Complaint]. Shortly thereafter, Samuel Keller, the former starting
quarterback for Arizona State University and University of Nebraska football teams, filed suit
regarding the right of publicity issue. Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10719 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). The Collegiate Licensing Company and EA settled for forty million dollars
leaving the NCAA as the sole defendant. Tom Farrey, Players, game makers settle for $40M, ESPN
(May 31, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11010455/college-athletes-reach-40-millionsettlement-ea-sports-ncaa-licensing-arm.
3 See Second Amended Complaint. O’Bannon sued after discovering a player in a NCAA video
game that shared similar physical characteristics as him such as height, weight, skin tone, hair
style, and jersey number. Id.
4 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
5 See id. at 1006. This decision would affect student-athletes who started attending school in
August 2015. Id.
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Additionally, Judge Wilken issued an injunction allowing colleges to place
money generated by the use of the student-athletes’ likeness into a trust fund.6 This
amount is limited to $5,000 per year of eligibility.7 The student-athlete would receive
this money upon graduation.8 If a school does not enter a contract to use the
student’s likeness, then no money is required to be placed into the trust fund.
Subsequently, the NCAA appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 9 On September 30,
2015, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the increase in scholarships; however, it struck the
$5,000 trust fund.10 The Ninth Circuit’s decision relied heavily on the NCAA’s
amateur reasoning11 and policy-driven considerations.12 The O’Bannon suit is not
the only recent attempt by student-athletes to receive compensation; however, it has
progressed the most in determining a solution.13
See id. at 963.
See id. at 1008.
8 See id. at 982.
9 Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Association, Second Amended Complaint,
Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). The NCAA argued that
Judge Wilken did not properly consider NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. when
making her decision. Id. at 26-31. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents,
468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (stating that it is essential to preservation of the character and quality of
college athletics that, “athletes must not be paid” and further, must have academics be their top
priority).
The Ninth Circuit had not finished deliberating and therefore, issued an injunction of Judge
Wilken’s decision to delay its effects. Steve Berkowitz, Judges Grant NCAA Request for a Stay;
O’Bannon Injunction on Hold, USA TODAY, July 31, 2015. The injunction delayed the effects of
Judge Wilken’s decision until the 2016-2017 school year. Id.
10 O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015).
11 See id. The NCAA argued that commercial pressures amongst college sports present the risk
that “an avocation will become a profession and that athletics will become untethered from the
academic experience.” Claire Zillman, As March Madness starts, the NCAA is Set to Fight to
Preserve Athletes’ Amateur Status, FORTUNE (March 17, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/03/17/marchmadness-ncaa-amateur-status/. The NCAA pleads that “its amateurism rules are legitimate-and
procompetitive-because they fundamentally define college athletics by ensuring that the players are
students and not professionals.” Id.
12 Marc Tracy & Ben Strauss, Victory for N.C.A.A. as Panel Strikes Down Pay for College
Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015, at B14. A Tulane law professor, Gabe Feldman, declared that:
[T]his is a huge victory for the N.C.A.A. There was some question about the future
of the amateurism model, and at least for now, a majority of this panel of the
Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed the N.C.A.A.’s amateurism model and their
definitions. The N.C.A.A. is allowed to use amateurism as a justification in
antitrust cases, and the N.C.A.A. is allowed to define amateurism as restricting
any payments to the cost of attending.
Id.
13 Ben Strauss, Waiting Game Follows Union Vote by Northwestern Players, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
26, 2014, at D4. Beyond the recent at-issue lawsuit, college-athletes have attempted to receive
compensation. In April 2014, scholarship football players from Northwestern University voted on
the possibility to certify the first college sports union. Id. An official of the National Labor
Relations Board determined that these players were employees of the University and therefore,
ought to form a union. Id. This would allow student-athletes to be entitled to workers’
compensation benefits and receive a portion of the college athletics revenue. Id.
Ultimately, the National Labor Relations Board struck down the petition to unionize the
Northwestern football players, in August of 2015, denying that student-athletes are university
employees. Ben Strauss, Labor Board Rejects Northwestern Players’ Union Bid, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2015, at B13. This decision relied heavily on the core principal that “college athletes are
primarily students.” Id.
6
7
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This comment explores the O’Bannon case in greater detail throughout four
sections. Part I provides background information on the applicable Antitrust and
Right of Publicity law as well as the NCAA student-athlete rules. Part II analyzes
the relationship between the law and the NCAA rules. Part II additionally discusses
the flaws in the O’Bannon ruling. Part III introduces a new proposal to compensate
athletes in exchange for use of their likeness in EA video games. Finally, Part IV
concludes the comment’s main points and reiterates a solution to minimize the
conflict between the two authorities of law and the NCAA student-athletes contracts.
II. BACKGROUND: THE TIP-OFF
Student-athletes sign a contract with the NCAA in which they agree to give up
certain rights in exchange for the opportunity to play in the NCAA. This agreement
gives rise to the dispute about athletes’ rights under antitrust law and rights of
publicity. This section deals with the legal history, policy implications, and the
status of what the law currently demands. This section also focuses on the effect that
the NCAA Bylaws and Compliance Forms have on student-athletes, which is the
heart of the O’Bannon lawsuit.
A. Antitrust Law
Antitrust law bars “unreasonable” restraints on trade.14 The enactment of
federal antitrust legislation followed the economic expansion and industrialization
following the Civil War.15 At the time, society viewed corporations as powerful and
controlling forces in the American economy.16 In response to a strong public fear
towards anticompetitive business practices, Congress enacted The Sherman Act
(“Act”).17 The Act, enacted in 1890, demonstrated the Supreme Court’s reliance on
economic concepts of competitiveness. 18 Congress designed the Act to correct the
growing evils of corporate control that “threatened to destroy the competitive
American economy,” as well as the American free enterprise system. 19 Corporate
Furthermore, the decision rests on the National Labor Relations Act and its promotion to create
a labor environment that is both stable and predictable. Kevin Trahan, NLRB rules Northwestern
Players Can’t Unionize, USA TODAY, Aug. 17, 2015. If the Board were to allow Northwestern
student-athletes to unionize and, furthermore, bargain with the University, it would go directly
against the Board’s Act by causing unsteadiness. Id.
14 VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 11.01
(2d ed. 2010).
15 See id. § 9.02.
16 See id.
17 See id. Congress’ power to enact the Act derived from its constitutional powers under the
Commerce Clause. Id. § 6.01.
18 See id. § 1.02.
Congress enacted the Sherman Act during an era of “trusts” and of
“combinations” of businesses organized and directed to control the market by suppression of
competition in the marketing of goods and services; a tendency that had become a matter of public
concern. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975).
19 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 1.02 (2d ed. 2010). While the Act presented a powerful start in addressing anticompetitive
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giants—such as the infamous Standard Oil Trust—motivated Congress to take action
toward implementing federal antitrust laws. 20 Antitrust law rests on the principle
that “the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation
of our economic resource, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest
material progress.”21
The Act’s principal substantive provision states that, “[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States . . . is hereby declared to be illegal.”22 This
section bans concerted activity that results in “unreasonable” restraints of trade. 23
A violation of Section One of the Act requires three elements: (1) a concerted
activity involving more than one actor, (2) an unreasonable restraint of trade, and
(3) an effect on interstate commerce.24 The main attribute separating Section One
from other sections in the Act is the rigorous nature and degree of proof required to
establish a section violation.25 Conduct is more likely condemned under Section One
due to the heightened proof a plaintiff must present. 26
The first and third elements are straightforward. The first element simply
states that more than one individual is involved with the activity. 27 Courts regularly
substitute “contract, combination, and conspiracy” with “concerted action.”28 The
business practices, large and powerful corporations managed to get around the law and continue
their illegal practices. Id. As a result of societal frustrations, the Court enacted the Clayton Act
(“Clayton”) in 1914, expanding the scope of antitrust regulation. Id. § 3.01.
The substantive provisions prohibit the following: anticompetitive price and sale term
discrimination, anticompetitive tying arrangements, exclusive dealing arrangements,
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions, certain corporate interlocks, and anticompetitive
restrictions in certain markets. Id.
20 See id. § 1.02. See also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). A large oil
company used its size and power to weaken other oil companies through unfair tactics such as
underpricing and threats to suppliers doing business with the large oil company’s competitors. Id.
at 43. The court held that these methods were “anticompetitive” and therefore, divided the large oil
company into several separate and eventually competing firms. Id. at 79.
21 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
22 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015).
23 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 2.01 (2d ed. 2010). Under the Section 1 language of the Sherman Act not all commercial restraints
are illegal. Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 580 (E.D. Pa.
2004). The restraint is illegal if it is unreasonable. Id. The courts determine unreasonableness
using either a “per se” or “rule of reason” analysis. Id.
24 Tan v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001). A restraint violates the rule of
reason if its harm to competition outweighs its procompetitive effects. Id. at 1063.
25 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 2.04 (2d ed. 2010).
26 Copperweld Corp v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984).
27 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 2.02 (2d ed. 2010).
28 See id. at § 1.02.
The Third Circuit determined that the terms “combination” and
“conspiracy” are interchangeable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
561 F.2d 434, 445 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Tidmore Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co./Gulf Prods. Div.,
932 F.2d 1384, 1388 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that “courts use the words contract, ‘combination,’ and
‘conspiracy’ interchangeably”).
Legislative history shows that Congress intends for the Sherman Act to be flexible in its
definitions and to rely on common-law meanings. National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
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third element simply asks whether a “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable”
effect on interstate commerce exists.29
The second element involves any “unreasonable” restraint of trade. 30 First, the
courts look to whether the concerted activity deals with a horizontal or vertical
restraint of trade.31
A horizontal restraint of trade usually involves direct
competitors or firms operating at the same market level.32 This type of restraint of
trade is applied with per se offenses.33 A per se offense presumptively carries an
anticompetitive effect with it.34 On the contrary, a vertical restraint applies between
suppliers and customers, and is not a per se offense.35
The second component that courts must decide is whether to apply the “per se
rule” or the “rule of reason.” The per se rule applies to horizontal relationships while
vertical instances are judged under the rule of reason. 36 The Supreme Court, in
recent years, restricted application of the per se rule.37 The rule of reason involves an
expansive analysis into the reasons and effects of the alleged restraint. 38 The burden
29 15 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2015). A plaintiff may prove the third element using one of the following two
theories: (1) flow of commerce test or (2) the affecting commerce test. Carpet Group Int’l v. Oriental
Rug Importers Ass’n, Inc., 227 F.3d 62, 75 (3d Cir. 2000). See also United States v. Giordano,
261 F.3d 1134, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001) (declaring that the first test can be pleaded when the activities
took place in the “flow of interstate commerce” and the second test may be applied when the
activities had or were likely to have a “substantial effect on interstate commerce”). In recent years,
more plaintiffs rely on the affecting commerce test because it is easier to satisfy. See VON
KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 6.02 (2d ed.
2010).
30 Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768. The Third Circuit held that the NCAA eligibility rules do not
fall within the meaning of “trade” under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Pocono Invitational, 317
F. Supp. at 581.
31 United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 313 (2d Cir. 2015).
32 Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
33 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 11.01 (2d ed. 2010).
34 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100.
35 Business Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. at 730.
36 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 11.01 (2d ed. 2010). An example of a per se violation is price-fixing. Bd. of Regents v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1304 (W.D. Okla. 1982). A court uses a per se analysis
when the restraint is “manifestly anticompetitive” on its face. Pocono Invitational, 317 F. Supp. at
584.
37 Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir.
1993). When a court decides an action is illegal per se, they must find it “so plainly harmful to
competition and so obviously lacking in any redeeming pro-competitive values that they are
conclusively presumed illegal without further examination.” Id.
38 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 12.01 (2d ed. 2010). When considering whether a restraint is unreasonable under the rule of
reason analysis, courts consider factors such as the condition of relevant markets before and after
the restraint, nature of the restraint, history of the restraint, the circumstances surrounding the
way in which the restraint is imposed, and any abnormal facts surrounding the way that the
restraint is applied. Id. Justice Brandeis outlined the scope of the rule of reason analysis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
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initially rests on the plaintiff to show an “adverse effect on competition.” 39 If a
plaintiff is successful, the defendant must show evidence of the restraint’s
procompetitive effects. Following the production of such evidence, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to establish other means “less likely to harm competition.” 40
Finally, courts balance the anticompetitive effects and the procompetitive effects of
the restraint derived from the agreement.41 The Clayton Act allows parties to
recover remedies such as damages, attorney’s fees, costs for injuries resulting from
antitrust violations, and injunctive relief.42
B. Right of Publicity
Right of Publicity is the inherent right of every43 individual to regulate the
commercial use of his or her own identity 44 and persona.45 The legal development is
traced through a variety of historical landmarks; 46 however, Judge Frank coined it as
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1919).
The key inquiry under the rule of reason analysis looks to whether the restraint enhances
competition. McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988).
39 Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 307 (2d Cir. 2008). See also
Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 858 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (stating the initial
issue in any rule of reason case is the market power; the ability to raise prices above the competitive
level by restricting output). The purpose of the Sherman Act is not to protect competitors, but
rather to protect competition. Id. at 859. To protect the benefits of competition, a less restrictive
substitute must be put into place. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012).
Within the first step of the rule of reason analysis, the law demands that the plaintiff prove:
(1) the defendants contracted or conspired amongst each other, (2) the contract or conspiracy
produced an anti-competitive effect within the relevant product and geographic markets, (3) objects
of and conduct derived from the contract or conspiracy were illegal, and (4) the plaintiffs were
injured as a proximate result of that conspiracy. Pocono Invitational, 317 F. Supp. at 580.
40 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 2.02 (2d ed. 2010).
41 See id. § 2.02.
42 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2015).
43 Donald S. Chisum, Tyler T. Ochoa, Shubha Ghosh, & Mary LaFrance, Understanding
Intellectual Property Law 773 (LexisNexis 2015). Some courts have held that this right is only
granted to celebrities, however a majority recognize this right for non-celebrities. Id.
44 Id. at 769.
The courts recognize one’s identity to encompass a person’s name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness. Id.
45 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1.3 (2d ed. 2015). Persona
is a label that signifies a “cluster of commercial values embodied in person[’s] identity.” Id. The
courts determined the traditional “name and likeness” to be inadequate and therefore, adopted the
term “persona.” Id. Judge Sofaer added that “the right of publicity protects the persona—the public
image that makes people want to identify with the object person, and thereby imbues his name of
likeness with commercial value marketable to those that seek such identification.” Bi-Rite
Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
46 Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 215 (1905) (the first sign of a common
law right of privacy occurred in the Georgia Supreme Court). A newspaper published an image of
the plaintiff for a Life Insurance Company ad without his consent. Id. at 193. The Court
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a “right of privacy.”47 Currently, no federal right of publicity exists. 48 Most states
recognize the right of publicity either at common law or by state statute. 49 The policy
driven publicity rights originate from natural rights of property justification. 50
To demonstrate that a defendant violated a plaintiff’s right of publicity, the
plaintiff must prove validity and infringement. 51 To show validity, he must
demonstrate that he owns an enforceable right in the identity or persona of an
individual.52 To demonstrate infringement, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
defendant, without permission, used that identity or persona and (2) the defendant’s
use has a high likelihood of causing damage to the commercial value of the identity
or persona.53 For the first element of infringement, the plaintiff’s identity must be
used in such a way that the plaintiff is “identifiable” 54 from the defendant’s use. 55
The second element requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant received
commercial gain from the use.56 While each state slightly varies in remedies, most
offer a successful plaintiff either injunctive or monetary relief. 57
C. NCAA’s Amateurism Policy
The NCAA Bylaws declare “only an amateur58 student-athlete is eligible for
intercollegiate athletics participation in a particular sport.”59 Additionally, the
determined that the publication “trespass[ed] upon plaintiff’s right of privacy.” Id. at 222. While
this right is founded in natural law, an individual may waive this right either expressly or
impliedly. Id. at 199.
47 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1.26 (2d ed. 2015). The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals first introduced the term “right of publicity” under New York
common law in 1953. Id. § 6.3.
48 Id. § 1.2.
49 Donald S. Chisum, Tyler T. Ochoa, Shubha Ghosh, & Mary LaFrance, Understanding
Intellectual Property Law 769 (LexisNexis 2015). More than thirty U.S. states recognize a right of
publicity. Id.
50 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 2.1 (2d ed. 2015). One
policy theory is a “self-evident natural property right.” Donald S. Chisum, Tyler T. Ochoa, Shubha
Ghosh, & Mary LaFrance, Understanding Intellectual Property Law 770 (LexisNexis 2015). The
policy driving this inherent property interest is the right to control how an individual, usually a
celebrity, is commercialized. Jonathan Faber, A Brief History of the Right of Publicity, Indiana: A
Celebrity Friendly Jurisdiction, Res Gestae, March 2000, Vol. 43, No. 9 (July 31, 2015). Beyond an
individual’s control over how his likeness is used, an individual must control if he will be used at all.
Id.
51 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 3.2 (2d ed. 2015).
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 See id. § 3.7. The courts ought to focus on “whether the figure is recognizable, not the number
of people who recognized it.” Negri v. Schering Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
55 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 3.2 (2d ed. 2015).
56 See id.
57 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 48-49 (2007).
58 Amateurism, NCAA.org http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
Generally, amateurism requirements ban things like “contracts with professional teams, salary for
participating in athletics, prize money above actual and necessary expenses, play[ing] with
professionals, tryouts, practice, or competition with a professional team, benefits from an agent or
prospective agent, agreement to be represented by an agent, and delayed initial full-time collegiate
enrollment to participate in organized sports competition.” Id.
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Bylaws clearly state that student-athletes must retain “amateur” status to maintain
a clear line between college athletics and professional sports. 60 The NCAA considers
amateur competition a core principle for college athletics.61 The policy behind the
implementation and maintenance of amateur status aims at placing academics and a
well-rounded education above athletics. 62 NCAA’s push to keep a clear line of
demarcation has led them to require all incoming student-athletes to sign various
documents. This documentation encompasses an agreement between the NCAA,
respective college, and the student to abide by NCAA regulations intended to protect
the student and his or her education.63 One form in particular, Form 15-3a,
designates an area for a student to affirm amateur status. 64
The NCAA’s amateur athleticism model has received a lot of pushback in the
past. Starting in 1984, the Supreme Court ruled that the NCAA cannot restrict the
number of televised games it allows. 65 However, Justice John Paul Stevens stated
that the NCAA may enjoy some freedom on enforcing rules to govern players, but this
was not discussed further.66 Additionally, in 2013 Ryan Hart also filed suit claiming
that the EA video game violated his publicity rights.67 In 2009, Sam Keller claimed
that EA’s use of his player’s likeness in its football game violated publicity rights. 68
This case eventually combined with the O’Bannon class-action suit in 2010. This is
one of the most recent and major cases that may completely alter the NCAA’s
amateurism policy.

59 NCAA,
2015-16 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS,
ADMINISTRATIVE
BYLAWS
§ 12.01.1
(2015),
available
at
www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D116OCT.pdf [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
60 See id.
61 Amateurism, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). Athletic
programs play an essential part in the educational program. NCAA MANUAL, § 12.01.2.
62 Amateurism, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
63 2015-2016 Division I Compliance Forms, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/2015-16-division-icompliance-forms (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
64 Form
15-3a:
Student-Athlete
Statement-NCAA
Division
I,
NCAA.org,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Form%2015-3a%20-%20Student-Athlete%20Statement.pdf
(last visited Oct. 9, 2015). Part III, entitled “Affirmation of Status as an Amateur Athlete” reads as
follows:
By signing this part of the form, you affirm that, to the best of your knowledge,
you have not violated any amateurism rules since you requested a final
certification from the NCAA Eligibility Center or since the last time you signed a
Division I student-athlete statement, whichever occurred later. You affirm
that . . . you have not provided false misleading information concerning your
amateur status to the NCAA, the NCAA Eligibility Center or the institution’s
athletics department, including administrative personnel and the coaching staff.
Id.
65 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
66 See id. at 117. Justice Paul John Stevens stated that “it is reasonable to assume that most of
the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur
athletic teams and therefore procompetitive because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate
athletics.” Id.
67 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146-147 (3d Cir. 2013). The court held that EA did not
sufficiently transform Hart’s identity in its game. Id. at 170.
68 Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10719 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). The court
held that EA’s use of Hart’s real-world physical likeness and football statistics are not sufficiently
transformative to engage First Amendment protection. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS: THE PLAY-BY-PLAY
The student-athletes brought this suit chiefly to question the contract that they
signed with the NCAA. 69 The student-athletes asserted that the contract caused an
unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore offended their antitrust rights. 70
Furthermore, the student-athletes alleged that the defendant’s use of their likeness
violated their publicity rights.71
A. Antitrust Law
The student-athletes dispute the validity of the form that the NCAA requires
them to sign before committing to play for a school. 72 They claim that the NCAA
highly profits from the NCAA video games that feature the student-athletes.73 The
student-athletes argue that the NCAA has committed an antitrust violation because
the contract restricts student-athletes from receiving any of those profits and
restricts them from entering into any personal contracts. 74
To demonstrate a Sherman Act violation, the student-athletes must prove the
contract creates an unreasonable restraint of trade.75 To do so, the student-athletes
use the rule of reason framework.76 This framework initially places the burden on
the plaintiff to show the contract has anticompetitive effects. 77 If the plaintiff is
successful, then the defendant must provide evidence of the restraint’s
procompetitive effects.78 A successful production of procompetitive evidence leads to
a shift back to the plaintiff to argue for substantially less restrictive alternatives. 79
Finally, the courts must balance the anticompetitive effects with the procompetitive
effects.80
See Second Amended Complaint. The contract includes a clause that reads:
By signing this part of the form, you affirm that, to the best of your knowledge,
you have not violated any amateurism rules since you requested a final
certification from the NCAA Eligibility Center or since the last time you signed a
Division I student-athlete statement, whichever occurred later. You affirm
that . . . you have not provided false misleading information concerning your
amateur status to the NCAA, the NCAA Eligibility Center or the institution’s
athletics department, including administrative personnel and the coaching staff.
Form
15-3a:
Student-Athlete
Statement-NCAA
Division
I,
NCAA.org,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Form%2015-3a%20-%20Student-Athlete%20Statement.pdf
(last visited Oct. 27, 2015).
70 See Second Amended Complaint.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 2.02 (2d ed. 2010).
76 O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1071.
77 See id.
78 See id at 1072.
79 See id at 1070.
80 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 12.02 (2d ed. 2010).
69
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1. Anticompetitive Effects
The plaintiffs claimed that the contract is an unreasonable restraint of trade
because it has significant anticompetitive effects on the players. 81 The Ninth Circuit
agreed with the players, holding that the “NCAA’s rules had significant
anticompetitive effects within the college education market, in that they fixed an
aspect of the ‘price’ that recruits pay to attend college.” 82 The Ninth Circuit reached
this decision by relying on two previous cases: Catalano and Board of Regents.83 The
Catalano Court used a per se analysis and held that the agreement was unlawful
per se.84 In the O’Bannon case, the Ninth Circuit erred by relying on this case. To
reiterate, the court uses a per se analysis when a horizontal restraint of trade is
present or when direct competitors operate at the same market level. 85 The court
applies the rule of reason in instances involving vertical restraint which is between
suppliers and customers.86 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the issue of
whether an agreement was necessary “is a factor relevant to whether the agreement
is subject to the Rule of Reason.”87
The second case that the Ninth Circuit relied on is Board of Regents.88 The
Board of Regents court declared that college sports need to enter certain horizontal
agreements to function.89 The Board of Regents court held that many NCAA rules
are part of the “character and quality of the [NCAA’s] product” and therefore, should
be analyzed using a rule of reason analysis.90 The Board of Regents court used the
proper rule of reason analysis as stated above. 91 However, the court recognized the
NCAA’s failure to tailor its plan to serve their competitive interests. 92 The NCAA’s
See Second Amended Complaint.
O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070.
83 See id. at 1071-1072. Catalano involves a group of beer retailers who alleged that another
group of beer retailers conspired with one another to end the customary practice of extending
retailers interest-free credit for a month following delivery of the beer. Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 643-645 (1980).
The Board of Regents case involves the NCAA television plan. The court determined that the
plan had “a significant potential for anticompetitive effects” however, it failed to analyze in greater
detail the specificity of how much the plan was restrictive. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104-105.
84 Catalano, 446 U.S. at 647.
The court reasoned that the agreement was a way of
“extinguishing one form of competition among the sellers.” Id. at 649.
85 Business Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. at 730.
86 See id.
87 American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 199 (2010).
88 O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1071-1072.
89 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103.
90 See id. at 102.
91 Id. at 103.
92 See id. at 119. NCAA’s television plan fails to “regulate the amount of money that any college
may spend on its football program or the way the colleges may use their football program revenues,
but simply imposes a restriction on one source of revenue that is more important to some colleges
than to others.” Id. at 117-120.
The Board of Regents court also held that the NCAA’s television plan operates to raise price and
reduce output, which are both unresponsive to consumer preference and therefore, represents
anticompetitive behavior. Id. at 113. On the contrary, here, the NCAA contract does not operate to
restrict price or output and therefore, does not have a negative effect on consumers. Form 15-3a:
Student-Athlete
Statement-NCAA
Division
I,
NCAA.org,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Form%2015-3a%20-%20Student-Athlete%20Statement.pdf
81
82
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action in the O’Bannon case differs because it successfully tailored its restraint to
serve its competitive interests.93
Even if the NCAA’s contract creates an
anticompetitive effect, it still has the opportunity to present pro-competitive
justifications.
2. Pro-Competitive Effects
If the student-athletes successfully show anticompetitive effects, the NCAA
must present pro-competitive justifications for having the contract laid out in its
current form. The NCAA provided four pro-competitive justifications for its
compensation rules; however, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis included only one
justification.94 The Ninth Circuit focused on the NCAA’s protection of amateurism as
they deemed it to be its strongest procompetitive effect of the restraint. As seen in
the Board of Regents, the NCAA has a “revered tradition of amateurism in college
sports.”95
The NCAA’s strongest argument for its policy having a procompetitive effect is
that its restraint broadens choices and, therefore, is competitive. 96 The Supreme
Court indicated that a restraint that widens consumer choice can be
procompetitive.97 The NCAA’s amateurism policy broadens consumer choice for the
fans and athletes by distinguishing college sports from professional sports. 98 It is
important to maintain a clear line between college sports and professional sports so
athletes recognize the choice between the two. 99 The NCAA provides the only
opportunity for young men and women to achieve a college education while playing
competitive sports as a student.
The Supreme Court declared that the NCAA “plays a vital role in enabling
college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be
marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.” 100 The NCAA wants fans to
identify its “product,” that is, the blend of student and athlete.101 The Supreme
Court held that “the preservation of the student-athlete in higher education . . . is
entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.” 102 In order for the NCAA to
(last visited Oct. 28, 2015). The NCAA contract asks that student-athletes give up extra-profit
opportunities; however, the NCAA provides scholarships in return. Id.
93 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119.
94 O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1058. The NCAA’s four procompetitive justifications in favor for its
compensation rules are: (1) promoting amateurism, (2) promoting competitive balance among NCAA
schools, (3) integrating student-athletes with their schools’ academic community, and (4) increasing
output in the college education market. Id. The district court accepted the promotion of
amateurism, integration of student-athletes and schools’ academic community, but rejected the
other two justifications. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp.3d at 1001-1004.
95 Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
96 O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072. Amateurism increases the popularity of college sports. Board of
Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-102.
97 See id. at 102.
98 See id. at 101-102.
99 Agnew, 683 F.3d at 340-345.
100 See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. The product involves a brand of football that
distinguishes an academic tradition from professional sports. Id. at 101.
101 See id. at 102.
102 See id. at 120.
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maintain the quality and character of its “product,” it must assure that students
attend class and are not paid.103 The NCAA pledges its loyalty to amateurism
through creation of a mutual agreement with the student-athletes to maintain the
integrity of its brand.104 By signing the 15-3a Form, student-athletes pledge their
commitment to amateurism.105 This commitment to amateurism increases its appeal
to consumers, which is a pro-competitive effect.
The NCAA’s restraint on student-athletes is in attempt to protect its brand and
moreover, protect amateurism, and therefore has a meaningful, pro-competitive
effect. Amateurism allows student-athletes to gain a college education and utilize
skills received from playing a competitive sport such as, leadership, communication,
and teamwork in order to excel in a future career. With the NCAA’s presentation of
its pro-competitive effects, the student-athletes would have the duty to present any
alternatives to the current contract that is substantially less restrictive.
3. Substantially Less Restrictive Alternatives
The student-athletes proposed two resolutions to the NCAA’s current restraint
on compensation: (1) increasing the scholarship amounts that NCAA member schools
give to the student-athletes and (2) allowing student-athletes to receive $5,000 per
year when their name, image, or likeness is used in a video game or for other
commercial purposes.106 The first alternative involves increasing the current
scholarship cap of just tuition to scholarships that cover full cost of attendance. 107
The second alternative allows the NCAA to give student-athletes a cash
compensation for its use of their likeness in its video games. 108 This alternative
would brand student-athletes as professionals, which alters a NCAA bedrock
principle: its amateur policy.109

See id.
See id.
105 Form
15-3a:
Student-Athlete
Statement-NCAA
Division
I,
NCAA.org,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Form%2015-3a%20-%20Student-Athlete%20Statement.pdf
(last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
106 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the first alternative;
however, struck down the second alternative. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
107 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 971.
In addition to tuition, this plan would include travel
expenses, housing, food, and other expenses. Id. While the president of the NCAA agrees that this
would not violate its amateurism principles, he worries—along with fifteen other scholars—that this
could open up the floodgates to new lawsuits demanding more changes of the NCAA’s rules.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074.
108 See id. at 1076. The option to compensate student-athletes concerns the Ninth Circuit as to
not compensate student-athletes is “precisely what makes them amateurs.” Id.
109 Amateurism, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).
Following the presentation of anticompetitive effects, procompetitive effects, and substantially less
restrictive alternatives, the Court now has a duty to compare these procompetitive effects with any
anticompetitive effects. VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION, § 12.02 (2d ed. 2010).
103
104
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B. Right of Publicity
The student-athletes also presented a right of publicity claim for the NCAA’s use
of their likenesses in the video games.110 They argued that the NCAA featured their
likenesses in the video games without their consent.111
1. The Transformative Use Test
Using the transformative use test, the district court incorrectly ruled in favor of
the student-athletes.112 The court erred when determining the NCAA video game to
not be transformative because the Supreme Court holds that video games are
expressive works.113
A case similar to the present one at issue is Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc.114 Ryan
Hart, a football player from Rutgers, claimed that EA used his likeness in the NCAA
football video game.115 The court found in his favor, holding that EA did not
sufficiently transform his likeness in the game.116 This court held that an interactive
player’s ability to transform the avatar’s characteristics is not sufficiently
transformative.117 However, a defendant’s reproduction of a celebrity image that
110 See Second Amended Complaint. Ultimately, on this issue, EA ended up settling with the
players for $40 million because the district court ultimately held that the use of these
student-athletes was not protected under the First Amendment. Tom Farrey, Players, game makers
settle for $40M, ESPN (May 31, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11010455/collegeathletes-reach-40-million-settlement-ea-sports-ncaa-licensing-arm.
111 See Second Amended Complaint.
112 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th
Cir. 2013). The Comedy III Productions court laid out the transformative use test: “whether the
celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or
whether the celebrity depiction or imitation is the very sum and substance of the work in question”
and “whether a product containing a celebrity likeness is so transformed that it has become
primarily the defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.” Comedy III
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 406 (Cal. 2001). The quantity, over the
quality, must be observed which means whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements
predominate in the work. Id. at 407.
113 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1248 (9th Cir. 2013). See also Brown v. Entm't
Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2765 (2011) (holding that a football-themed video game embodies
expressive and artistic elements).
114 Hart, 717 F.3d at 141. The Third Circuit balanced the interests of use protected by the first
amendment and right of publicity protection. Id. at 149. The court framed the issue as, whether
Hart’s identity was sufficiently “transformed” in the NCAA football video game? Professor Rodney A.
Smolla, Videogame Avatars: A Question of Transformative Use, THE MEDIA INSTITUTE (Aug. 26,
2013), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2013/082613.php.
115 Hart, 717 F.3d at 145-147.
116 See id. at 170. Specifically, the court stated that:
The digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan Hart did while at Rutgers: he
plays football, in digital recreations of college football stadiums, filled with all the
trappings of a college football game. This is not transformative; the various
digitized sights and sounds in the video game do not alter or transform the
Appellant’s identity in a significant way.
Id. at 160.
117 Ronald S. Katz, When Rights of Publicity Trump 1st Amendment, LAW 360 (May 22, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/444030/when-rights-of-publicity-trump-1st-amendment.
When
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incorporates expressive elements is entitled to as much First Amendment protection
as an original work of art.118
In the present case, the district court found that student-athletes should win on
the right of publicity claim.119 This outcome is incorrect because NCAA games are
highly creative and sufficiently transformative. EA created a new, digital world that
encompasses all of the components that sports fans love about the games of football
and basketball. The video game includes virtual stadiums, coaches, fans, sound
effects, music, announcer commentary, and includes aspects of the NCAA teams such
as players, jerseys, and mascots.120 Beyond the normal play mode, an interactive
user can create his own character, roster, and playing conditions such as special
events and weather conditions. 121 In creating a character, one can pick everything
from physical features to player statistics to even picking the character’s
hometown.122 Furthermore, a player has the option of creating his own playbook in
which he gets to use his talents to create completely new plays.123 The interactive
user can create, upload, and share rosters with other interactive users. 124
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to rule that EA’s video game is not
transformative due to its visual depiction of real people poses a threat to other
mediums that visually depict real people such as, novels, documentaries, and
songs.125 Justice Thomas worried that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “jeopardizes the
creative use of historic figures in motion pictures, books, and sound recordings.” 126
Mediums such as a documentary would be granted even less protection than video
games as it is solely a literal depiction. 127
Even if the video game is not successful under the transformative use test, it is
successful under the Rogers Test as supported by Ninth Circuit case law.
2. The Rogers Test
The Rogers Test is used when dealing with expressive works. 128 The Hart court
quickly shut down the Rogers Test. 129 The Rogers Test is often used in similar cases,

determining whether a work is sufficiently transformative, courts may find it useful to look at the
marketability and economic value and whether it derives primarily from the fame of the celebrity
depicted. Comedy III Productions, 25 Cal. 4th at 407.
118 See id. at 408.
119 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1284.
120 Video game: NCAA Football 14 (Electronic Arts 2013).
121 See id. An example of a special event is the NCAA championship game.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech vs. Right of Publicity in Sports Computer Games, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2015.
126 Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1290 (9th Cir. 2013). Justice Thomas expressed
his concerns in his dissent. Id.
127 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech vs. Right of Publicity in Sports Computer Games, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 2, 2015.
128 Tom Zuber & Jeff Zuber, Brown v. Electronic Arts, Inc.: Lanham Act Protects Video Games,
not Athletes, LawUpdates.com (Sept. 24, 2013), http://www.lawupdates.com/commentary/ibrown_v._
electronic_arts_inc._i_lanham_act_protects_video_games/.
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however, like Brown v. EA.130 The law required retired football player James Brown
to overcome this test by showing that the NCAA football game either (1) has no
artistic relevance to the underlying work or (2) if it does have any artistic relevance,
the use of his likeness explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the work.131
The Supreme Court held that video games are expressive works. 132 The Brown court
quickly agreed that the game contains at least some artistic relevance, satisfying the
first prong, and promptly moved on to the second prong.133 As the Brown court
determined, the Madden game does have at least some artistic relevance and
therefore, Brown had to show that the use of his likeness explicitly misled as to the
source or content of the work.134 The Ninth Circuit ultimately found in favor of EA
using the Rogers Test.135
The Madden games include the same creative features as the NCAA game. 136
Similar to the court in Brown, the O’Bannon court ought to find that the video game
is artistic enough to overcome the student-athletes’ claim. Although the NCAA video
game can be viewed as transformative, the student-athletes must still consent to the
NCAA’s use of their likenesses.

129 Hart, 717 F.3d at 157. The Third Circuit deemed the Rogers Test a “blunt instrument, unfit
for widespread application in cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two fundamental
protections: the right of free expression and the right to control, manage, and profit from one’s own
identity.” Id.
The test focuses on consumer confusion and whether the title of a work will mislead consumers
as to the work’s content. Ronald S. Katz, When Rights of Publicity Trump 1st Amendment, LAW 360
(May
22,
2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/444030/when-rights-of-publicity-trump-1stamendment.
130 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013).
Retired football player James
Brown filed suit against EA for the use of his likeness in its Madden NFL video game. Id. at 1240.
131 See id. at 1239.
132 See id. at 1248. See also Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. at 2765 (holding that a
football-themed video game embodies expressive and artistic elements).
133 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d at 1243-1247. Rogers stated “that balance will normally
not support application of the Lanham Act unless the use of the trademark or other identifying
material encompasses no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever.” Rogers v. Grimaldi,
875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). This is different than Brown’s argument that the rule only
requires that the artistic relevance be merely above zero. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d at
1243.
134 See id. at 1246. Brown’s presented four arguments: (1) the use of his likeness combined with
a consumer survey raises a triable issue of fact under the second prong, (2) the written materials
with versions of the game proves the defendant attempted to explicitly mislead consumers,
(3) altering his likeness satisfies the second prong, and (4) defendant’s verbal comments
demonstrates sufficient evidence to satisfy the second prong. Id at 1245-1248. His four arguments
in favor of this prong failed to satisfy the second prong. Id.
135 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d at 1241. The Ninth Circuit determined that the video
game was creative and artistic enough to overcome Brown’s claim and therefore, video games are
protected under the First Amendment as guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 1248.
136 Video game: Madden NFL 14 (Electronic Arts 2013). As the Madden games recreate and add
to the NFL league, the NCAA game recreates its league while adding creative elements. Id. The
“NCAA Football” video game will not mislead a consumer as the game is related to NCAA football.
Id.
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As previously explained, the contract that student-athletes sign to play makes
them a part of the NCAA and a crucial component of its “product.”137 The
student-athletes agree to maintain amateur status by not doing things such as,
“receive any compensation” and “enter into any contract or agreement with a
professional team or sports organization.” 138 Instances of explicit deception as to the
source or content of the work is diminished when the student-athletes assign their
publicity rights to the NCAA.139 The contract on its face is fair to athletes as the
court established that maintaining amateur status is an essential part of the NCAA
student-athlete program. While NCAA’s contract language is fair, an issue may be
that the student-athletes do not fully understand the terms to which they are
agreeing and the repercussions of signing the contract. The NCAA Bylaws must be
changed in order to better fit antitrust and right of publicity law in its policy.
IV. PROPOSAL: OVERTIME
The student-athletes want to receive compensation for the NCAA’s use of their
likeness for commercial purposes.140 The NCAA has a high desire for students
involved in its athletic program to maintain an “amateur” status. 141 The best
solution would encompass a portion of what each party wants.
A. Antitrust Law Proposal
An NCAA witness, Neal Pilson, testified that “if you’re paid for your
performance, you’re not an amateur.” 142 He added that he would still be troubled
with payment to students even if it were deferred until after the student-athletes
graduate.143
The court compares options that offer student-athletes
education-related compensation and offering student-athletes cash sums completely
unrelated to their educational expenses.144 The court determined that the distance
between the two is great in size. 145
The consumer’s desire for amateurism, rather than the NCAA’s high demand for
amateurism, is most relevant in an antitrust analysis.146 Dr. J. Michael Dennis, an
expert witness, conducted surveys regarding consumer attitudes towards college
sports and compensation.147 The survey results demonstrated that “the public’s
137 Form
15-3a:
Student-Athlete
Statement-NCAA
Division
I,
NCAA.org,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Form%2015-3a%20-%20Student-Athlete%20Statement.pdf.
(last visited Oct. 28, 2015).
138 NCAA MANUAL, § 12.2.
139 See id.
140 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982.
141 See id. at 973.
142 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1077. Neal Pilson was previously a television sports consultant for
CBS. Id.
143 See id. at 1078.
144 See id. at 1078-1079.
145 See id. The court describes the difference as a “quantum leap.” Id.
146 See id. at 1081.
147 See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 975.
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attitudes toward student-athlete compensation depend[s] heavily on the level of
compensation that student-athletes would receive.”148 The conclusion runs parallel
to Mr. Pilson’s testimony that “smaller payments to student-athletes would bother
them less than larger payments.”149
Overall, the general public opposes
student-athletes being compensated beyond their scholarships. 150
The NCAA spends over $2.7 billion in assisting its participating schools to
support student-athletes.151 It is no secret, however, that the student athletic
programs at a number of Universities are flawed. Student-athletes experience
difficulty balancing their schoolwork and the mandatory hours necessary towards
their team. More than a dozen NCAA schools failed to graduate at least half of their
players.152 Furthermore, student-athletes suffer emotional and mental health issues
associated with the end of the sport and graduating. 153 Not all schools have
programs specifically tailored to accommodate these health issues. 154 Finally,
student-athletes express an overwhelming struggle to jumpstart their careers after
graduation.155 The NCAA could distribute the money that it makes from using the
student-athletes for commercial purposes, such as the NCAA video games, to benefit
both the NCAA and student-athletes. A portion of the proceeds earned from the
video games can be given back to the schools to help fund athletic programs. The
money can go towards athlete costs like travel expenses, lodging, training facilities,
trainers, athlete living expenses, and physical and mental health programs. The
NCAA could also disburse funds to support student programs geared towards
academics and post-graduation. These programs could embrace enhanced tutoring
See id.
See id.
150 Alex Prewitt, Large Majority Opposes Paying NCAA Athletes, Washington Post-ABC News
poll finds, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 23, 2014. Sixty-four percent of the general public are
against paying college athletes. Id. This compares to the mere thirty-three percent who support
paying salaries to college athletes. Id.
151 Investing
where it matters, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/investing-where-it-matters (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). An overwhelming majority of the
money goes towards team travel, food, lodging, participating in tournaments, insurance programs,
and tutoring services. Id.
152 Jen Christensen, Life after basketball takes former players down different paths, CNN (April
5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/02/us/ncaa-basketball-graduation. The study conducted by the
Institute for Diversity and Ethics in Sport observed student-athletes and their likelihood to
complete their degrees in six years. Id.
153 Elena Schneider and Cara Cooper, After Final Whistle, Former College Athletes Face Relief,
Depression, HELIX (June 18, 2013), https://helix.northwestern.edu/article/after-final-whistle-formercollege-athletes-face-relief-depression. Sports psychologists, through their studies, have determined
that thousands of NCAA student-athletes experience emotional and physical difficulties with
transitioning from a “life centered on athletics” to a life without any sports involvement. Id.
154 See id. Several Big Ten athletic departments lack mental-health services for their senior
players. Id. Upon graduating, many former student-athletes experience a sense of loss that creates
difficulty in moving forward with life beyond college. Id.
155 About After the game, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/former-studentathlete/about-after-game (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). The NCAA launched “NCAA After the Game”
which is intended to assist student-athletes in moving forward after their college careers come to an
end. Id.
The program “uses compelling texts and videos to highlight what former NCAA
student-athletes are doing now.” Id. The program also includes a job board in which students can
post their resumes and look for job opportunities. Id.
148
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programs and temporary sponsors or career counselors to assist with the completion
of their degree and with their job search. This proposal allows student-athletes to
receive indirect compensation, which essentially allows the NCAA to maintain
amateurism.156
B. Right of Publicity Proposal
The student-athletes also claim that their contract with the NCAA intrudes
upon their right to protect one’s “name, voice, signature, photograph, image, and
likeness.”157 When a student takes on the role of both a student and an athlete, he is
required to sign a contract with the NCAA. This contract lays out a wide variety of
terms that encompass the NCAA Bylaws including, conditions on the use of a
student-athlete’s name or likeness.158 Mainly, a non-institutionalized charitable,
educational, or nonprofit agency may use a student-athlete’s likeness; however, a
number of conditions must be fulfilled.159
Similar to any contract, it can be difficult to read and fully understand all the
implications that one is agreeing to upon signature. Currently, the NCAA Bylaws
prohibit any individual that strives to be a student-athlete from being represented by
an athlete agent during present or future negotiations. 160
Thus, while a
student-athlete is signing his contract, he cannot have a representative there to
assist him with his understanding of the terms and conditions. On its face, the
student-athlete’s signature on this agreement does not violate his publicity rights. If
156 Another possible solution is to allow the student-athletes to decide if they want their
likeness to be used in exchange for a trust-fund. When signing the NCAA contract, student-athletes
could enter either class A or class B. Class A would give the NCAA permission to use their likeness
and the student-athletes would receive the trust-fund upon graduation. On the other hand, if
student-athletes enter class B they would deny the NCAA permission to use their likeness; however,
they would receive no trust-fund.
This is problematic because (1) it gives student-athletes too much power in the decision-making
process and (2) this would diminish the NCAA’s amateurism policy and is therefore, not effectively
solving the problem. Additionally, uniformity appears to be an essential component in maintaining
amateurism and this proposal creates a divide amongst the student-athletes.
157 Jonathan Faber, A Brief History of the Right of Publicity, Indiana: A Celebrity Friendly
Jurisdiction, Vol. 43, No. 9 (July 31, 2015).
158 See NCAA MANUAL. The Bylaws state, under section 3.2.4.19.1:
For agreements that may involve the use of a student-athlete’s name or likeness,
an institution shall include language in all licensing, marketing, sponsorship,
advertising, broadcast and other commercial agreements that outlines the
commercial entity’s obligation to comply with relevant NCAA legislation,
interpretation and policies on the use of a student-athlete’s name or likeness.
Id.
The NCAA Bylaws also contain the rules surrounding promotional activities. Id. Section 12.5
indicates that a “non-institutional charitable, educational or nonprofit agency may use a
student-athletes name, picture or appearance to support its charitable or educational activities or to
support activities considered incidental to the student-athlete’s participation in intercollegiate
athletics.” Id. An agency may do so as long as a long list of conditions are met, described in
sub-sections (a)-(i). Id.
159 See id.
160 Current Student-Athletes, Notre Dame, http://www3.nd.edu/~ncaacomp/Amateurism_Agents
.shtml (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
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he is not fully aware of what he is agreeing to, however, then he has not fully
consented, which does rise to a right of publicity violation.
To ensure a student-athlete is knowledgeable with regard to the terms and
conditions, the NCAA must be required to assist students in being well-versed in
what it means to give up one’s “likeness.” The NCAA must alter its Bylaws to
include a NCAA representative that meets with the potential student-athlete before
signing the contract. The assigned representative will explain exactly what one’s
“likeness” entails and what it means to assign his rights to the NCAA. Furthermore,
the NCAA can require potential student-athletes to attend “likeness training.”
During these training sessions, student-athletes gain the knowledge they need to
make an informed decision and furthermore, consent, to release their publicity
rights.
V. CONCLUSION: UPDATING THE PLAYBOOK
Congress introduced the Sherman Act in response to a rise of fear and distrust
in large corporations.161 The policy driving publicity rights stems from natural
property rights.162 O’Bannon and a number of student-athletes argued that the
NCAA’s rules violate both the Sherman Act and their right of publicity.163
O’Bannon argued the NCAA’s contract that all student-athletes are required to
sign creates an “unreasonable” restraint on trade. 164 O’Bannon also claimed that the
NCAA violated his publicity rights. 165 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the increase in
amount of scholarships granted to student-athletes; however, it struck the $5,000
trust fund.166

161 See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 9.02 (2d ed. 2010). The public feared the presence of anticompetitive business practices in the
American economy. Id.
162 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1.2 (2d ed. 2015).
Judge Frank devised this as a right of publicity. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,
202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). Society wants individuals to regulate any commercial use
involving his own identity.
163 See Second Amended Complaint.
164 See Second Amended Complaint.
The Sherman Act bars any activity that results in
“unreasonable” restraints on trade. See VON KALINOWSKI, SULLIVAN, & MCGUIRL, ANTITRUST LAWS
AND TRADE REGULATION, § 2.01 (2d ed. 2010). The Act’s principal substantive provision states that,
“every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States . . . is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2015).
The contract prohibits student-athletes from receiving any profits generated from NCAA video
games.
Form
15-3a:
Student-Athlete
Statement-NCAA
Division
I,
NCAA.org,
https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Form%2015-3a%20-%20Student-Athlete%20Statement.pdf.
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015). Furthermore, the contract restricts the student-athletes from entering
licensing deals with anyone outside of the NCAA realm. Id.
165 See Second Amended Complaint.
O’Bannon argued that the NCAA used his likeness,
without his consent, and profited greatly from it. Id. The court analyzed and balanced the NCAA’s
policy of barring student-athletes from earning compensation and its “procompetitive” reasoning
behind it. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
166 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1079.
Judge Wilken initially ordered that the schools give
student-athletes a $5,000 trust fund, which the student-athletes could access upon graduation.
O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 982.
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Under an antitrust analysis, the NCAA’s desire to maintain and promote
amateurism creates a reasonable restraint on trade.
As the NCAA keeps
student-athletes as amateurs, they experience a healthy integration of both
academics and athletics.167 Furthermore, the court erred when it declared that the
NCAA video games failed to be transformative. Using the transformative test
analysis, the video games are transformative as the games create an entire virtual
arena. The games allow the interactive user to add creative elements and completely
be in charge of the game. Even if the video games were to fail using the
transformative test, they succeed under the Rogers Test. The Ninth Circuit
previously held that the NFL Madden video games are artistic and expressive, which
is sufficient to pass the Rogers Test. 168 The NCAA games are almost identical to the
NFL games and therefore, are sufficiently transformative.
The most successful proposal is one that encompasses the student-athletes’
demand for compensation and the NCAA’s continued enforcement of its amateur
policy. To better accommodate antitrust law, the NCAA can create a system that
compensates student-athletes indirectly. The NCAA can disburse a number of the
proceeds earned to help fund student-athletic programs like training facilities, tutors,
career guides, and health programs.
This proposal represents the NCAA’s
student-athlete brand well and allows the NCAA to preserve amateurism.
To fix the publicity rights issue, the NCAA must allow a representative to help
student-athletes before they sign the contract and understand what use of their
“likeness” means. The NCAA can also implement likeness training to better inform
student-athletes about signing this portion of the contract.
The NCAA “supports learning through sports by integrating athletics and higher
education to enrich the college experience of student-athletes.”169 In order “to create
the framework of rules for fair and safe competition” the NCAA’s amateurism policy
must remain active.170

The Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Wilken that both an antitrust violation and right of
publicity violation was present. O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053. The Ninth Circuit, however, declined
Judge Wilken’s $5,000 trust fund proposal. Id.
The sole reason for Judge Wilken’s $5,000 trust fund proposal was Neal Pilson’s “offhand
comment.” Jon Solomon, Court shuts down plan to pay athletes, says NCAA violates antitrust law,
CBS SPORTS, Sep. 30, 2015. Under cross-examination, Pilson stated that “a million dollars would
trouble me and $5,000 wouldn’t but that’s a pretty good range.” Id.
167 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1002-1003. This restraint protects the student-athletes and the
consumer which is essential to continue fueling college athletics. Id.
168 Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d at 1243.
169 Who We Are, NCAA.org, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).
170 See id.

